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INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
David E. Ervin* 
International agricultural trade has emerged on center stage in 
many recent agricultural policy discussions. Frequent questions 
concern the expected volume of future exports, effects of embargoes, 
tariffs, etc., and roles of public and private sectors in enhancing 
sales of U.S. farm products to foreign buyers. Unfortunately, there 
are more good questions than good answers. 
The papers collected here are intended to shed some 1 ight on 
future agricultural trade issues. Authors presented their thoughts 
at the annual Agricultural Policy Seminar held as part of 
Agricultural Science Week on the University of Missouri-Columbia 
campus in February, 1984. 
Three quite different perspectives are offered. In the first 
paper, Professor Bredahl outlines the dimensions of agricultural 
trade from the university or academic viewpoint. He first reviews 
the impressive rise of U.S. agricultural exports during the 1970s and 
the equally startling fall in the early 1980s. Two sets of factors 
have been accused of turning the export trend downward. First, other 
countries are alleged to take advantage of the U.S. residual-supplier 
position in many export markets. Macroeconomic forces, including the 
wor·ld recession, developing country debt problems, and an over-priced 
dollar comprise the second group of factors. Bredah 1 argues that 
competing exporters have in fact exploited the U.S. residual-supplier 
status, selling their farm exports just below the U.S.-determined 
world price while we accumulate stocks. With regard to macroeconomic 
forces, he points out that the less developed countries played an 
unappreciated and dominant role in the recent rise and fall of U.S. 
exports. In the forseeable future, these countries are not likely to 
regain their affluent importing posture of the late 1970s, Bredahl 
concludes. A direct implication is that the U.S. has a vested 
interest in fostering economic growth in those deve 1 oping countries 
in order to increase our future trade possibilities. One way of 
*Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural 
University of Missouri-Columbia. 
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Economics, 
helping that growth is to increase our imports of their products. 
Policies to outcompete our rival agricultural exporters are not the 
primary answer. 
Mr. Carpenter then presents a view of agricultural trade from 
the perspective of the public sector and producer commodity groups. 
He argues that the pro-export posture and actions of the current 
administration should be continued in order to offset downward price 
pressure from anticipated increases in agricultural production and 
weak domestic demand growth. Given the likelihood of a continuing 
strong dollar, Carpenter outlines several ideas for enhancing U.S. 
agricultural trade: (1) emphasize "value-added" products, (2) 
improve quality and skills of overseas salesmen, and (3) sell 
products that meet foreign consumers' preferences. He fee 1 s that 
agricultural trade improvement is more dependent on exporters ' 
actions than government policies. An aggressive marketing strategy 
is the key. Departing from the marketing theme, Carpenter comments 
that GATT's credibility must improve in the near future. 
Specifically, inefficient producer subsidies should be discouraged. 
In closing, the author argues strongly that agricultura l exporters 
must become international salesmen and not wait for negotiated 
favorable trade restrictions. 
In the final paper, Mr. Schwarz addresses agricultural trade 
issues as viewed by private industry. He focuses first on what a 
"business perspective" is. High on the list of characteristics are 
making a profit and providing the products consumers want and can 
afford. These characteristics help orient the following discussion 
of factors affecting agri cultura 1 exports to deve 1 oping countries. 
Foreign customers are influenced by their level of economic 
development, food and trade policy, and political willingness to 
import our products, Schwarz argues. The author's experience with 
agricultural imports by Korea, Mexico, Venezuela, and Brazil 
illustrates how those factors can vary and influence the nature of 
trade. What our foreign customers are able to buy is influenced both 
by purchasing power and infrastructure. The purchasing power to 
import our products must come from exporting their products. Credit 
can be used to augment purchasing power but can become excessive and 
threaten long-term development. Infrastructure, e.g., 
transportation, storage, and processing facilities, serves to define 
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the upper limit of potential imports. Adequate investment is 
critical. In closing, Schwarz explains how different dimensions of 
agricultural commodity prices, e.g., the exchange rate, influence 
private industries' profits and trading opportunities. 
Some common themes emerge from the papers. No one takes issue 
with the proposition that growth in U.S. agricultural trade will come 
predominantly from developing countries. But, to foster export 
markets, we must assist those economies in their economic development 
by importing their products and providing credit and/or general 
economic aid . Finally, the prospects for U.S. agricultural exports 
are by no means bleak. Aggressive marketing and understanding 
factors influencing trade will help boost farm exports. However, we 
should not look to increased trade as a solution to short-term farm 
income problems. 
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FUTURE DIMENSIONS OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE: 
AN ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE 
~laury E. Bredahl* 
In order to determine the future dimensions of agricultural 
trade, it is necessary to review the U.S. export performance of the 
1970s and early 1980s. The value of U.S. agricultural exports 
increased dramatically from 1972 to 1974 and then reached a plateau 
of about $23 billion which held until 1977. Starting in that year, 
exports expanded rapidly to a peak value of over $43 billion in 1981. 
In 1982, the value of agricultural exports fell to $36.5 bill ion; it 
is expected to fall further to about $34 billion this year. 
The growth of export quantities and values of individual 
commodities was nothing short of spectacular during the 1970s . Corn 
increased at the fastest rate, fo 11 owed by wheat and soybeans. The 
average annual growth rates {1970-1980) are: 
Corn 
Wheat 
Soybeans 
Quantity (%) 
14.4 
6.8 
5.6 
Value 
\%} 
23.6 
18.2 
15.3 
Corn exports peaked at over 60 mi 11 ion metric tons {MMT) in 1980, 
more than 3 times greater than the 1970 level, while wheat peaked at 
43.9 MMT in 1981, 150% greater than its 1970 level. Soybean exports 
increased steadily throughout the decade, with the 1982 level 
reaching 112% of the 1970 level. 
The collapse of the U.S. corn and wheat export markets beginning 
in 1981 was sudden, large, and not at all expected. From their peak 
values, the quantity of corn and wheat exports have declined 29% and 
22%, respectively. The va 1 ues of these exports have fa 11 en 42% and 
32%, respectively. While the quantity of soybeans held about on 
trend, the value has fallen slightly. 
As the new administration took office in January, 1981, it 
seemed assured the export market would take increasing quantities of 
U.S. agricultural commodities. In the environment of federal budget 
*Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
University of Missouri-Columbia. 
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reductions at that time, the incentives offered to farmers to reduce 
production were small despite large levels of government and private 
stocks. That attitude prevailed in the second year as well. 
Production and stocks of major comnodities increased to postwar 
highs. Real farm income fell to postwar lows. Subsequently, the 
administration was forced to take drastic action; the costly payment-
in-kind (PIK) program reduced area planted dramatically by trading 
stocks in return for idled area. That reduction plus the reduced 
yi e 1 ds due to the worst drought in fifty years have reduced stocks 
and strengthened current prices of some commodities and farm i ncomes. 
Maintaining the U.S. share of existing foreign markets and 
developing new markets is widely viewed as necessary for U.S. 
agricultural prosperity during the 1980s. A number of steps have 
been taken to accomp 1 ish those ends: funds for commercia 1 export 
credit guarantees have been doubled, a blended credit program has 
been es tab 1 i shed, market deve 1 opment and Pub 1 i c Law 480 funds have 
been increased, and subsidized exports have displaced competitors' 
exports in selected markets. The loan rates, claimed to exceed world 
market clearing prices, coupled with a strong dollar were argued to 
have overpriced U.S. products in world markets. Therefore, some loan 
rates have been reduced. 
The United States has not been content with these measures. The 
Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community was assailed at 
the recent GATT ministerial meeting. The point of contention was 
subsidized exports. Interchanges were so be 11 i gerent and dogmatic 
that some observers concluded an agricultura l trade war was in the 
offing. The trade policies of Japan were criticized as well. The 
point of contention was import quotas on such products as beef and 
citrus. 
Our criticisms are justified and at least in part motivated by 
the widely held perception that the United States plays fair, but 
other countries do not. To be sure, other factors are mentioned: 
the large stocks of cereals and cotton, the reduction of planted area 
by the very expensive PIK program, and the lowest level of real farm 
income in many decades. It is argued that these are symptoms of, 
among other things, a particular market structure in which the United 
States acts as the residual supplier. One must quickly add that the 
United States has accepted that role voluntarily; it is a consequence 
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of U.S. domestic farm policies. I will return to this point later. 
The fall in the quantity and value of U.S. agricultural exports 
is attributed not only to actions of competitors and the residual-
supplier market structure, but to the world recession and the debt 
problems of many less developed countries as well. The strong dollar 
is said to overprice U.S. agricultural exports. All of these factors 
have come to be grouped under the term "macroeconomic forces." Some 
have argued that these forces have come to dominate the level of U.S. 
agricultural exports and world agricultural trade. I will address 
macroeconomic factors after discussing market structure. 
Market Structure 
Many argue that the United States acts as the residual supplier 
to world agricultural markets and that other nations take advantage 
of that role. 
The description of the United States as the residual supplier in 
world agricultural markets is widespread in the professional 
literature and the popular press. Despite its widespread use, it is 
a s 1 i ppery concept to define. For ex amp 1 e, Kelly Harrison, former 
General Sales Manager of the USDA, presented the following view: 
"Since the United States has been a major, if not dominant, 
supplier in international markets, U.S. domestic price 
policy has set price levels and other exporters have 
operated in their own best interests within that 
environment. The net effect has been an oligopolistic 
competitive structure with U.S. price leadership and market 
sharing among other exporters. The United States then acts 
as the residual supplier through its open export-marketing 
system. This, of course, is an over simplification of a 
very complex process" (p. 904-5). 
Paarlberg wrote: 
" •.• we pursued policies that made us--unfortunately--the 
residual supplier in world markets. We held our export 
prices above world levels. Other exporters priced their 
products a cent or two under ours and sold their supplies. 
Buyers would purchase these bargain products first, then 
turn to the United States to round out their needs" (p. 
35). 
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My colleague, Harold Breimyer, takes an opposite point of view: 
"We hear it said that the United States is a poor old weak 
residual supplier in world trade. Hokum! •.• There is no 
such thing as a residual supplier." 
Dr. Breimyer points out that the United States is the dominant 
supplier in world cereal and oilseed markets and that the United 
States sets the tone. How then, he asks, can the United States be a 
residual supplier? 
Before reconci 1 i ng these views, it is necessary to review the 
evidence cited by proponents of the residua 1-supp 1 i er notion. They 
point out that not only is the United States capturing a smaller 
piece of the international trade pie, but, to make matters worse, the 
pie is getting smaller. The accompanying table summarizes market 
shares of world trade for wheat and feed grains. Clearly, the size 
of world markets has declined and the United States has lost a share 
of the markets, especially for wheat. At the same time, they note 
that although the United States has reduced production and 
accumulated stocks (at great expense), competitors have not done so. 
Residual-supplier proponents usually point to world markets for wheat 
and feed grains. In response to government policies, U.S. production 
of wheat was reduced 14 percent from 1982 to 1983. Production of 
feed grains is down about 48 percent; about a third of that decline 
is due to government policies and the other two-thirds is due to the 
drought. Production in other countries has not declined in response 
to oversupply in world markets. For example, Canadian wheat 
production in 1983 exceeded the record level reached in 1982. The 
Argentine wheat crop also reached a record level this year. 
Just as the U.S. government and farmers envisioned a robust 
world market for agricultural products in the 1980s, so did the 
governments and farmers of all agricultural exporting countries. 
Those governments undertook projects to increase export capacity and 
farmers were prepared to benefit. For example, the Canadian 
government es tab 1 i shed an export goa 1 of 35 MMT to be reached by 
1985. In order to meet that goal, export facilities to serve foreign 
markets were increased. Rail rates, set in the 1 ate 1800s, will 
likely be revised so as to favor investment in railcars to move farm 
products from the prairie provinces to port facilities. The end 
result is a Canadian agricultural production and export capacity in 
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World Wheat and Feed Grain Exports and 
Major Exporters' Share 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983* 
Wheat 
World Exports 
(mil. met. T.) 86.0 94.2 101.3 97.8 98.5 
Share of total (%) 
u.s. 43 .3 44.5 48.5 40.9 38.6 
Canada 17.4 18.0 17.5 21.6 21.8 
,_. EC (10) 12.1 15.6 13.3 13.8 12.7 0 
Feed Grains 
World Exports 
(mil. met. T.) 100.9 105.5 103.6 89.0 92.4 
Share of total (%) 
u.s. 71.0 68.6 59.3 59.9 63.6 
*Estimated 
the 1980s that greatly exceeds that of the past two decades. The 
governments of all grain-exporting nations are under pressure from 
farmers and politicians to utilize their new capacity.' 
The essential feature of the residual-supplier market structure 
is that all nations -- importers as well as exporters -- insulate 
domestic producers and consumers from market forces. The mechanism 
that determines market price is a residual of those policies; the 
U.S. loan rate sets the world market price and it accumulates stocks. 
The United States may no longer be willing to play that role . 
Unless world demand resumes its robust expansion of the 1970s, 
world markets will clear only at price levels unacceptable to U.S. or 
Canadian farmers and their governments. Let's turn now to that 
question. 
Macroeconomic Forces 
In order to determine the factors that caused U.S. and world 
exports to expand and then decline, I wi 11 identify first the major 
markets and then changes in exports to those markets. While the 
value of exports to traditionally important markets -- the European 
Community (EC) and Japan -- increased, their relative importance 
declined. That decline in relative importance is due to the much 
more rapid growth in imports of other deve 1 oped countries and 1 ess 
deve 1 oped countries. The growing importance of these countries is 
best illustrated by looking at changes in exports rather than 
absolute levels. 
The astonishing observation to be made is how much of the change 
in exports, both the 1976-81 increase and the 1981-82 decrease, was 
accounted for by less developed countries. But the summary data hide 
some detai 1. Among less developed nations, oil exporters such as 
Venezuela and Mexico, and the newly industrializing nations of South 
Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan joined with fringe countries of Europe 
(those outside the EC) to account for 58 percent of the $20 
billion increase in U.S. exports from 1976 to 1981. These countries 
were equally important in the downturn, contributing about 58 percent 
of the $6.7 billion decline from 1981 to 1982. 
Traditionally important markets, the European Community and 
Japan, accounted for only about a quarter of the growth from 1976 to 
1981 and decline from 1981 to 1982. Contrary to popular opinion, the 
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Buying 
Countries 
EC & Japan 
Other Developed 
Less Developed 
Centrally Planned 
Total 
Buying 
Countries 
EC & Japan 
Other Developed 
Less Developed 
Centrally Planned 
Total 
Value of U.S. Agricultural Exports 
1976 1981 
bi 1. bil. 
_ $_ % _ $ _ % 
10.0 43.7 15.6 36.3 
3.7 16.1 6.5 15.1 
6.8 29.7 16.0 37.2 
2.4 10.5 5.3 12.3 
22.9 100.0 43.0 100.0 
Change in Value of U.S. Exports 
1976-81 
bi 1. 
_$_ % 
+5.7 28 
+2.7 13 
+9.2 45 
+2.9 14 
+20.3 100 
12 
1982 
bi 1. 
_$ _ % 
13.8 37.7 
5.8 15.8 
12.9 35.2 
4.3 11.7 
36.6 100.0 
1981-82 
bi 1. 
_$_ % 
-1.8 27 
-0.7 10 
-3.2 48 
-1.0 15 
-6.7 100 
central plan countries (USSR, China, Poland, etc.) did not play a 
dominant role in either the expansion or contraction of U.S. 
agricultural exports during this period. 
Let me turn now to an explanation of the decline in imports of 
developing countries and of U.S. agricultural exports. 
Rising level of income was an important factor in the expansion 
of consumption and imports of farm products by newly industrializing 
countries in the 1 ate 1970s. But a number of other factors p 1 ayed 
important roles. 
Many of these countries had simply neglected their agricultural 
sectors in favor of industrial development. At the same time, 
consumer food prices, particularly of necessities, were held down by 
low producer prices and/or subsidies. Adoption of these policies was 
encouraged by the ready avail abi 1 i ty in world markets of food and 
feedstuffs at relatively cheap prices. But that picture changed 
dramatically when the price of agricultural commodities skyrocketed 
beginning in 1973. In reaction to the rising import prices, many of 
these countries adopted new policies later in the decade favoring the 
agricultural sector and leading to increased production. Many even 
saw an opportunity to export agricultural products. Increasing 
agricultural production takes time; the effects of these policies 
have been evident only recently. 
During the mi d-1970s and 1 ater, many of the countries found 
external credit readily available. Their own foreign exchange 
earnings were increasing. They were able not only to expand 
agricultural capacity, but to expand industrial capacity while 
continuing to subsidize food prices in the face of rap-id domestic 
inflation. Consumers were, in turn, able to increase consumption of 
animal proteins -- requiring imported feed grains and oilseeds; and 
consumption of high quality cereal products -- requiring imported 
wheat. The story varies across countries, but Mexico provides a good 
example. From 1975 to 1980, export earnings increased from $3 
billion to $16 billion; per capita real income increased by 3.6 
percent annually; meat consumption by 45 percent; and the value of 
food imports from the United States (primarily corn, sorghum, and 
wheat) reached $2.7 billion in 1980. By 1980, Mexico had become the 
third largest market for U.S. agricultural products. 
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The 1980s have brought di ffi cu 1t times for these countries. 
Their foreign debt burden has become huge. Brazil owes $90 billion, 
Mexico $80 billion. Foreign exchange earnings have declined with the 
fa 11 in both price and quantity for those countries' exports of oil 
and other raw materials. Their industrial exports also have 
declined. As a result, many of these countries have not been able to 
make interest payments, much less repay the principal of loans. 
In an attempt to reduce government spending, food consumption 
subsidies have been slashed in several of these countries. Their 
consumers have faced not only a declining level of income but sharply 
increased food prices. Animal proteins and high quality cereals bear 
the brunt of the adjustment of their diets -- and their buying. At 
the same time, those countries have given agriculture a more 
favorable treatment than before in an attempt to reduce expenditures 
of foreign exchange earnings for food. These pol icy changes either 
reduce the rate of growth of foodstuff imports or in some cases force 
a decline. 
Expressed in other terms, during the 1970s a tremendous amount 
of purchasing power was transferred from industrial countries to less 
developed countries. This amounted to a shift in purchasing power 
from consumers who spend a small proportion of added income on food 
to consumers who spend a large proportion on food. That transfer is 
another way of accounting for the surge in agri cu 1 tura 1 exports 
during the 1970s. In the 1980s, the transfer ceased and so did the 
uptrend in world trade. 
Implications 
If this appraisal of the world demand for agricultural products 
is correct, the capacity to produce food wi 11 exceed the abi 1 i ty to 
purchase it, at least for the next several years. Who will bear the 
costs of adjusting? 
U.S. agricultural policies allow U.S. producers to profit when 
world markets are booming (as in 1973-80), but the policies also 
force producers to bear the brunt of the world adjustment when 
markets are oversupp 1 i ed. That is, producers will bear the brunt 
unless a costly government program transfers a substantial part of 
the costs to U.S. taxpayers. 
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Responding to the short-run imperative, the very costly PIK 
program, with cons i derab 1 e he 1 p from the drought, has temporarily 
increased prices and farm income. But what of the longer r un? Will 
the United States maintain its past position as the residual 
supplier? Will it instead isolate its farme rs from world markets and 
dump excess production into world markets by whatever means 
necessary? Will policies, as some suggest, get government out of 
agriculture and let market forces work? 
Complicating the pol icy choice is that the United Stat es is so 
big in world grain markets that its actions have a lot to do with 
setting the tone -- the terms of doing business -- for those markets. 
Even after some slippage in recent years, the United States supplies 
about 40 percent of the world's wheat exports and more than 60 
percent of feed grains. The United States does not enjoy the 
strategic freedom of, say, a Thailand or other country that supplies 
only a small proportion of world supply. 
But the United States cannot only attempt to obta i n a larger 
portion of the world market at the expense of our competitors. We 
must recognize that the growth market for U.S. agricultural exports 
is the developing nations of the world. In order to realize the 
potential ability of U.S. agriculture, we must foster economic 
development and income growth in these nations. An important factor 
in fostering that growth must be mutually beneficial bilateral trade. 
In the fi na 1 analysis , we cannot expect to export more of the 
products which we produce cheaply --wheat, corn, and soybeans, for 
example -- unless we are willing to import the products wh i ch other 
nations can produce cheaply. The mutual benefits of bilateral trade 
are clear. 
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FUTURE DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE: 
A PUBLIC SECTOR PERSPECTIVE 
Steve Carpenter* 
I have been asked today to discuss the impact of the changing 
dimension of agri cu 1 tura 1 trade from the pub 1 i c-sector perspective 
and from the eyes of producer commodity organizational groups. 
Having worked for government and commodity trade associations, I have 
found the concerns, problems, and challenges in exporting 
agricultural products similar, if not identical. I will attempt to 
relate what I feel are pertinent and critical factors and concerns 
that will affect agricultural trade through the remainder of the 
1980s. 
It is obvious that agricultural trade will continue to be 
affected by agricultural policy decisions that will be made through 
the remainder of this decade. The dimensions of this issue are 
primarily international, and therefore many, if not most of the 
answers are outside of our control. Decisions that will be made in 
agricultural policy through the 1980s and 1990s will be heavily 
determined by the political and economic environment which prevails 
in the world at that time, and that makes long-term agricultural 
trade impossible to predict. 
Therefore, I think it is important for us to take a closer look 
at short-term situations and factors affecting our agricultural trade 
growth, some of the things that agribusiness must take a look at in 
order to enjoy a healthier farm economy. 
Both Congress and the Administration continue to maintain a 
strong posture for the promotion of exports. Market development and 
PL-480 funds have been increased, the blended credit program was 
created, more funds for commercial export credit guarantees were 
provided, and even subsidized exports were introduced against 
competitors' exports in specific markets--the latter being a trade 
posture statement by the current admi ni strati on. Other action has 
been taken also. All of these things should and probably will be 
continued. 
*Executive Director, Missouri Corn Growers Association. 
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The point is, strong emphasis on exports continues because of 
the realization that exports are vital. With the increase in 
production that will occur during the coming decade as a result of 
technological advances, improved management, etc., and with the 
relatively small increase in population that will occur in the U.S., 
an expansion of export markets is imperative. It is assumed, 
therefore, that this pro-export posture will continue and additional 
incentives will be developed. 
What is the Outlook? 
On the agribusiness front, as well as the rest of the country, 
there is finally a little good news. Economic recovery in the U.S. 
has been underway for more than a year now, and the numbers are 
impressive. Unemployment figures are trending downward and we have 
more people in full-time jobs than ever before in the history of our 
nation. ·That means they can afford to buy food, and agri cu 1 ture wi 11 
benefit as still more jobs are created and more people return to work 
in 1984. 
The full effect of this scenario at the farm level may not be 
rea 1 i zed right away, but neverthe 1 ess these are positive factors. 
From the grain industry perspective, which I am most closely 
associated with at this time, the optimism is guarded in the short 
term and much more positive for the long term. Grain exports appear 
to be a leveling out during the mid-1980s, while the late 1980s show 
signs of extremely good growth. USDA's Economic Research Service 
(ERS) recently forecasted that U.S . feed grain exports would reach 
3.7 billion bushels by 1991-92. Some industry forecasters predict 
5.0 billion bushel exports with the start of the new decade. 
As you know, a strong dollar combined with worldwide economic 
problems increased competition, and growing trade restrictions have 
devastated U.S. agricultural exports. Most of these factors will not 
change dramatica l ly in the next several years. What wi 11 and must 
change, I believe, is our ability to deal with these impediments. 
An Example 
Any decline in the value of the dollar is unlikely. The reason 
is three-fold: 
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Our inflation rate is one of the lowest in the world. 
Our real rate of interest is among the highest in the world. 
The U.S. appears to be the safest investment home for 
currencies around the world. 
Since these factors are not likely to change in the short term, all 
fingers point toward a continuing strong dollar. 
What then, is the answer for increased U.S. agricultural trade? 
How will the downward trend be reversed? 
First of all, we must learn how to sell agricultural products in 
the face of a strong dollar--a difficult, but not impossible task. 
The dollar's strength will make it most difficult for commodity or 
"primary" products to compete in the world marketp 1 ace. It wi 11 a 1 so 
be difficult, but much easier, for "value-added" products, since we 
have the factors of market quality, dependability, service, and other 
attributes which are strong sales tools to use with our foreign 
customers. 
Much has been said about the potential for value-added product 
sales. The reality of the situation is that small- and medium-sized 
export businesses have not yet made the commitment to the export 
market. The irony of this is that the greatest potential for 
expanding agri cu 1 tura 1 product exports rests with these same sma 11 
businessmen. 
This is the point of departure I take now in pointing less of an 
"accusing finger" at policy decisions made by the Congress and the 
Administration and question to a greater degree the individual 
exporter's abi 1 ity or commitment to export agri cu 1 ture and 
agriculture-related products. 
In spite of a strong dollar, world economic recession, increased 
competition, and foreign trade restrictions, I know of companies and 
I have friends who are in the export business and who have been 
success fu 1 in their export objectives in recent years. Unfortu-
nately, this has not been the case for the majority of sma 11- and 
medium-sized exporters in this country and in this state. Faced with 
tough times, most smaller exporters have elected not to pursue the 
export rna rket and instead have concentrated on domestic markets in 
which they have more confidence. 
All U.S. exporters must improve the quality and skills of their 
overseas sa 1 esmen and design products that meet the needs of the 
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ultimate consumer. We all must be asking ourselves how we can better 
respond to foreign consumer needs an.d wants. Putting ourselves in 
the shoes of the prospective buyer and asking what the buyer wants 
and when he wants it is the cornerstone for export development. 
Generally, U.S. businessmen are ill-prepared to do business in 
the international marketplace. Surprisingly, many are unfamiliar 
with the details of their own products. Most are unable to integrate 
financing, meet overseas documentation needs, and provide after-sales 
servicing. 
When we look at the question of future dimensions of agricul-
tural trade, I believe that the degree of success we experience in 
the next few years will be directly proportional to the ability of 
U.S. exporters to fine tune their international sales and 
market-development skills. 
Exporting is not one or two trips to the Far East each year. 
Exporting is not communicating by telex with a foreign buyer. 
• Exporting is not hosting a trade team delegation into your 
facilities every other year. 
Exporting and international marketing involves a carefully 
articulated marketing plan. Research, experimentation, persistence, 
flexibility, and, above all, commitment are essential elements to a 
successful overseas marketing endeavor. Properly planned short-term 
marketing strategies with well-thought-out practical tactics to 
implement these strategies are required in the international market 
just as they are for markets here at home. Exporters must find their 
place in the market, target the right people to sell the concept or 
the product, take the time to know the environment, be committed, and 
have the patience and perseverance to stay with the marketing 
program. 
In my estimation, the future growth of agricultural trade lies 
more in the hands of the exporters and the decisions they will make 
rather than the hands of the policy decision makers at the government 
levels. If we 1 ose our agri cultural com pet iti veness, government 
policies are essentially meaningless. 
This is the approach that we are taking with the Missouri Corn 
Growers Association (MCGA). It is our belief that through a farmer-
initiated "self-help" program, we can work collectively to promote, 
advertise, merchandise, and expand and develop new markets for corn 
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and corn products. Effectiveness of our programs will be measured in 
how well we are able to adapt to conditions worldwide and sell the 
type of product the foreign buyer is demanding. 
The MCGA is affiliated with the U.S. Feed Grains Council. In 
recent years, the Council has utili zed producer funds and deve 1 oped 
markets for feed grains overseas. For every dollar invested, $80 in 
new export sales has resulted. 
The American Soybean Association tells us that for every dollar 
invested, $57.50 was returned in farm cash receipts. 
As a commodity organization, we believe in market development 
and building demand even in the face of tough times. 
It is my sincere belief that Missouri companies, no matter how 
small or large they may be, can also build export demand for their 
products by utilizing the many tools that are available to them. 
Numerous programs and information materials are available to 
companies from various private and government agencies, associations, 
and groups. Special assistance programs such as those from the Small 
Business Administration provide the necessary start-up capital a 
sma 11 export company may need. New export credit guarantee 
legislation at the state government levels has been and continues to 
be deve 1 oped for the benefit of export business. New trade too 1 s 
such as barter arrangements and the new export trading company 
legislation are options available to export companies. 
We must be more aggressive! 
I'd like to jump back into the international policy decision-
making arena for one key point. 
This final comment relates to GATT. Many of us question whether 
GATT as an international "rule-making" body is effective. GATT's 
credibility has been severely tested in recent times. Some wonder if 
GATT rules are only black ink on white paper. This situation must be 
remedied over the next few years if agricultural trade is to advance 
and if U.S. agriculture is to compete freely and fairly in 
international markets. 
The disputes over and uses of export subsidies to undercut our 
markets is a prime example. The principal offender in this regard is 
the EED (wheat, flour, poultry, and meat). Now they are threatening 
actions against our oilseed products and corn gluten feeds. 
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At the moment, inefficient producers of agricultural products 
(especially the EC) are enjoying a larger share of the international 
market while more efficient producers of agricultural products (U.S.) 
watch their portion of the pie getting smaller. This makes no sense 
and cannot be allowed to continue. 
What then are the "future dimensions of agricultural trade?" No 
one knows for sure! 
Trade po 1 icy decisions certainly wi 11 p 1 ay an important ro 1 e. 
Currency fluctuations, protectionism, increased competition, and 
other trade barriers will always be at our front door step. 
We must make a decision as international businessmen. Do we 
learn how to function in the international marketplace with these 
outside forces or do we sit back and assume trade restrictions will 
be negotiated in our favor? Do we wait for favorable political and 
economic conditions before making a commitment to the export market? 
We can't afford to sit back and wait! 
We must adapt to market conditions and take part in formulating 
new rules and regulations. We are not yet international salesmen! 
We must become international salesmen if agriculture is to be 
profitable! The future of agricultural trade is in the hands of 
those who are successful in developing effective export strategies. 
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FUTURE DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE: 
A PRIVATE SECTOR PERSPECTIVE 
F.H. Schwarz* 
A subject such as this gives the speaker a wide latitude. One 
could make projections or expound on the benefits of one policy over 
another. Rather than attempt such alternatives, I would like to try 
to take a truly private-sector approach. Let me emphasize that these 
are my thoughts, not the thoughts of "the private sector" or even 
those of my employer. 
Let's think of the future dimensions of doing business in 
international agricultural trade. That part of trade which is 
generally of most interest here is U.S. exports. The major 
agricultural exports are, of course, grains and soybeans, but the 
points that I will make apply to other agricultural products as well. 
Maury's scenario leads us to developing countries as the major growth 
markets of the future. So we might focus on future dimensions of 
doing business in U.S. agricultural exports to developing countries. 
One 1 as t introductory point -- what are dimensions? I have 
assumed that dimensions are those factors that will affect our 
business opportunities. The factors we must watch, perhaps react to, 
and perhaps influence to build a strong business. We will discuss 
these factors at length. My presentation is divided into two main 
sections. First, what is a business perspective? Second, what are 
the major factors that will affect the future business of U.S. 
agricultural exports to developing countries? 
Business Perspective 
A business perspective first and foremost places great 
importance on making a profit, a return of one's shareholders. 
Profit is a measure of health. It is better to have more than less. 
Profit is the measure by which we allocate our resources -- capital 
and effort. It 1 eads us into some and out of other businesses. It 
encourages us to work more effectively and more efficiently. 
*Director, International Business Development, Ralston Purina 
Company, St. Louis, Missouri. 
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I should say that we don't just go our way and make a profit. 
Business goes out to do something else that earns it a profit. That 
something else is usually related to the material needs of society. 
People need products and services. Businesses operate to meet those 
needs. Profit is the end result of how well business meets society's 
material needs. 
Let me clarify "needs." Business does not earn a profit by just 
satisfying needs. That is the province of relief organizations. 
What I mean to say is that business must provide the product the 
customer wants and is able to buy. Too often we are myopic and push 
the products we need to move -- the ones that are in excess supply. 
A business perspective must also include the realization that 
there are a number of participants in the marketplace other than 
businesses that do have a legitimate role. Those participants tend 
to be government corporations or government agencies. They buy, 
sell, and make policies that influence the marketplace. Discussion 
continues as to what government's role should be and to what extent 
it should intervene. There are less right answers to these questions 
than there are value judgements. 
In summary, a business perspective places importance on 
providing the product that the customer wants and is able to buy and 
on making a profit. We will be talking about developing countries, 
and their wants and abilities are strongly influenced by government 
policy. Therefore, when we say customers, we refer to countries and 
the companies and government agencies within them. 
Factors Affecting Exports to Developing Countries 
Fo 11 owing the theme we have begun, 1 et' s first 1 ook at the 
factors that affect what our customers want to buy and are able to 
buy. Then let's look at factors that affect price. Price is used 
here as a proxy for profits. To include a discussion of costs would 
be too involved. 
What are the factors that affect what our customers want to buy? 
I would suggest that these factors include the country's progress in 
economic development, its food and trade policy, and its po 1 i ti ca 1 
willingness to buy. 
Let's look at our customers' progress in economic devel opment 
from which needs are derived. There may be a need for grain such as 
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corn for direct human consumption in Mexico. As incomes rise, so 
does the demand for meat and thus the derived demand for feed grains 
and soybean meal for the livestock and poultry industry, as we have 
seen in Korea. If we are to have a good customer, we must understand 
why he has a need for U.S. agricultural exports. If there is not a 
good reason, there is a chance that our business does not have the 
basis for a solid long-term relationship. 
Another factor is the country's basic food and trade policy. 
There are generally four major goals to food policy. The first is 
agricultural production. In many developing countries, the 
population is highly rural and agricultural production is an 
important source of economic activity and income. A second goal is 
income distribution. Even in economies where growth is impressive, 
not everyone shares in the benefits of growth. Those concerned with 
economic development have been looking much harder at how food 
production can improve the incomes of the poorest strata of the 
population. A third goal of food policy is nutrition, but nutrition 
programs per se seldom result in much effective demand for U.S. 
agricultural exports. A fourth goal is food security -- the ability 
to maintain secure, adequate quantities of food for time of 
emergency. 
From these goals, one can see that different countries could put 
different values on whether to depend upon national food production 
or to use imports as a major means for food supply. This in turn 
affects trade po 1 icy. The less abi 1 i ty a country has to purchase 
imports, the more emphasis that can be expected for national 
production. Self-sufficiency in food is generally of importance 
politically if not economically. 
Some years ago, I had the opportunity to look at the wheat and 
feed grain imports of Korea, Mexico, Venezuela, and Brazil. At the 
time, Venezuela still imported like a petroleum oil exporter. We 
found cases in Korea and Venezuela where imports related closely with 
population, per capita income, and poultry and hog numbers. Quite 
obviously in this case, the imports were being used as part of a 
development process. In Mexico and Brazil, however, imports 
correlated with shortfalls in domestic production, world grain 
prices, and foreign exchange reserves. In this case, imports were 
being used only occasionally when national production was inadequate. 
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Regardless of the rhetoric, the data showed that two different and 
distinct needs were being satisfied and two different policies were 
being employed. 
There is also a political willingness to buy, as politics can 
play a heavy role in trade. This depends in part on our willingness 
to purchase our customers' exports. It is, for example, unrealistic 
to expect China to import all of its agricultural commodities from 
the United States while at the same time we discuss 1 imitations on 
Chinese textile exports to the United States. 
Dependability is also a major issue. The soybean embargo of the 
early 1970s certainly motivated the Japanese to establish sources in 
Brazil. The grain embargo to the Soviet Union added further 
questions to our role as a reliable supplier. You need to know on 
whom you can depend when you are a government leader and your countt·y 
is short of food. 
So the factors we must watch to determine what our customers 
want to buy are a country's progress in economic development, its 
food and trade policy, and its political willingness to do business 
with the United States as a supplier. 
What are the factors that affect what our customers are able to 
buy? Two points are most important purchasing power and 
infrastructure . Purchasing power for imports comes fi r st and 
foremost from export earnings. That was most obvious in the 1970s 
when newly rich oil exporters began spending like never be fore. The 
situation is more serious now. Export earning s depend upon the 
health of the world economy, the willi ngness of industr i al countries 
to import, the composition of devel oping country exports, and the 
amount of export earnings that must be used to serv i ce ex isting 
external debt. Trade is certainly needed in both directions. 
Credit is a means of overcoming a lack of purchas i ng power, but 
it must be used car·efully. The world has a number of examples of the 
excessive use of credit. As a result , the International ~1onetary 
Fund and commercial bank creditors have increased their pressure for 
improved economic management. Credit not only improves a country's 
ability to buy, it can improve the seller's competitiveness as well. 
For example, USDA has developed a number of excellent credit programs 
over the years that have strongly supported U.S . exports. Credit, 
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therefore, properly used, can be quite beneficial to both the seller 
and the purchaser. 
There are some ingenious means of overcoming the lack of 
purchasing power, and most buyers are promoting them to their 
fullest. Barter, the exchange of one product for another, or 
countertrade, the agreement to purchase an amount equal in value to 
that which you have sold, are two examples. These practices could 
grow significantly. There are a number of experiments, and how fast 
we move in the direction of countertrade depends to a large part on 
how well someone can secure a solid competitive advantage. There is 
nothing wrong with wanting to incur an income before you incur an 
expense. It's difficult, however, to justify making a purchase just 
so you can make a sale. 
Another factor in a country's ability to buy is its infra-
structure- its roads, railroads, port facilities, and shipping, 
handling, storage, and distribution equipment. There also needs to 
be capacity in processing, such as grain processing, oil mills, feed 
plants, poultry operations, and slaughterhouses. How much investment 
has gone and will go wto agriculture significantly influences our 
markets for grains and oilseed. 
For example, general estimates indicate that the port facilities 
of the Soviet Union can accomodate 45 million tons of grain a year. 
Even if that country needed to import more, they physically could not 
handle it. 
The Mexican railroad system was built in the 1930s. A few years 
ago, U.S. railroads embargoed further shipments into Mexico because 
thousands of units of their rolling stock had not been returned. If 
there is not increased investment in transportation and storage 
facilities in Mexico, it will be difficult for us to increase our 
exports to them. 
As mentioned earlier, the demand for livestock and poultry 
products increases with increases in incomes. Such income growth is 
occurring in a number of countries in the world. In order for us to 
develop our feed grain markets, there needs to be further investments 
in our customers' feed facilities, and poultry, hog, dairy, and beef 
operations. In the U.S., prices have been high enough over the years 
to stimulate investment, and capital has been available. Conversely, 
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in Mexico, there has been approximately a 35 percent reduction in the 
hog herd in the last year because of a combination of price controls 
and insecurity of inputs. This is not conducive to increasing 
investment. 
To summarize, we have covered five factors that affect what our 
customers want to buy and are able to buy, which in turn affects our 
ability to make export sales. These include our customers' progress 
in economic development, their food and trade policy, their political 
willingness to purchase, their purchasing power, and their 
infrastructure. 
Finally, let's take a look at price as a proxy for our ability 
to make a profit. What are the dimensions of our price? Market 
size, U.S. price supports, and the strength of the dollar are all 
important, as are the pricing policies of other countries. 
One of the dimensions of price is the size of the market in 
which the forces of supply and demand interact. If the size is the 
world market, we can expect more stability, especially in price. If 
numerous bilateral agreements remove significant quantities from the 
interaction of supply and demand, then both our international and 
domestic activities will be part of the residual world market. In 
this case, we can expect prices to be more volatile. 
Another dimension of our price is U.S. price support programs 
and how the prices of these programs compare to world market clearing 
· prices. There have been a number of statements in the literature and 
in the press recently on the umbrella effect of higher U.S. prices --
how they stimulate our competition and prohibit U.S. agriculture from 
showing its real comparative advantage. I would rather not enter 
this debate, but would like to note that it is a factor to watch. 
The strength of the dollar is certainly another very important 
factor in the pricing of U.S. agricultural exports. What we have 
seen in the last few years is a strong demand for the dollar. 
Currencies, like commodities, go up in price under conditions of a 
strong demand. That means it takes more Mexican pesos or Korean won 
to buy a dollar's worth of corn or soybeans. 
The 1970s have seen the development of major international 
capital markets. In addition to commodities moving from country to 
country, there are now significant movements of money. Money 
movements demand currencies just as do trade movements. As more 
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foreign citizens desire to invest in the United States, they bid up 
the price of the dollar. Our national policy of high interest rates 
and high government deficits has contributed to the dollar's 
strength. No 1 anger does trade a 1 one determine the exchange rate. 
Quite apart frorn the dollar price of the agricultural commodity, we 
have the foreign currency of the dollar. 
There is one more point on which I would like to touch in this 
discussion of price. That is the pr1c1ng policies of other 
countries. A number of industrialized countries, not only the U.S. 
but a 1 so the European Community and Japan as we 11, have more of an 
income policy for their agricultural sector than a trade policy. It 
is interesting to note that where there is surplus production in the 
world, local prices exceed world market clearing prices. We find too 
much rice in Japan and too much milk in Europe. Conversely, in many 
of the developing countries, we find the heavy hand of price controls. 
Agricultural production in many countries could be stimulated by 
higher prices to the farmers. The consequence of that, however, is 
higher prices of food to the urban poor. When faced with higher 
costs for food, the urban poor tend to riot, threatening governments. 
We cannot expect a government to take an action that will cause it to 
no longer be a government. Thus, domestic pricing policies of our 
developing country customers as well as our industrialized country 
competitors affect the price levels at which substantial trade may 
occur. 
In summary, we have talked about a private-sector perspective to 
doing business in U.S. agricultural exports to developing countries. 
We talked about meeting the customers' needs and making a profit. 
Then we talked about the factors that affect what our customers 
want to buy and are able to buy. The five factors to watch are: 
l. progress in economic development 
2. food and trade policy 
3. political willingness 
4. purchasing power 
5. infrastructure. 
Finally, we discuss four factors that will affect the prices we 
receive. These include: 
1. market size 
2. U.S. price supports 
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3. the strength of the dollar 
4. other national pricing policies. 
There are a number of dimensions to a private-sector perspective 
of future international agricultural trade. We must monitor them 
carefully, influence them where we can, react to them where we 
cannot. With free markets and our solid comparative advantage, it 
should be good business. 
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